This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
This review examines critical questions related to whether the outer space is a global common; it also addresses the challenge of achieving balance between the outer space treaty (OST) mandate of compliance with the common interest principle and requirement of providing an environment for the success of commercial lunar enterprises while simultaneously mitigating the possibility of conflict on the Moon.
香京julia种子在线播放
The United Nations has identified four
This article explores four pertinent questions that are raised by the rejection of outer space as a global common: (1) What is a global common ? (2) Is outer space a global common? (3) How does outer space as a global common influence the exploration and use of space? (4) Does the OST require space to be a global common or could the benefits and interests of all countries be achieved in other ways? The article also presents some concluding remarks.
Global common refers to international, supranational, and global resource domains containing common-pool resources that lie beyond national jurisdictions. However, in the absence of an authoritative definition, varied interpretations of the term global common have led to inconsistent application or rendered the intended meaning unclear.
The term global common is better understood by examining its applicability in the context of the concept of sovereignty
Global common can be viewed from two perspectives: first, the global common can be viewed as an enabling concept from the perspective rooted in geopolitical or military relevance; second, the global common can be viewed as a constraining concept from the perspective of economic and commercial implications of the shared resources, which could be overused by some at the expense of others, regardless of national jurisdiction. The global common may also be viewed from the perspective of national interest as well as from an international perspective related to its governance and protection.
A global common is understood to be a supranational domain outside national jurisdiction that contains a common pool of resources for all.
The term global common is not mentioned in the OST. Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is the domain located beyond approximately 100 km above the Earth’s surface, which is accepted as the unofficial boundary between outer space and air space. Outer space also includes its natural resources.
There are two categories of natural resources in space: those that are recognized as
The foundational legal attribute of outer space precludes the application of state sovereignty in outer space as well as categorically and unambiguously denies any and all claims of sovereignty, especially the application of traditional sovereignty to outer space and celestial bodies (
Article I (often referred to as the “common interest principle”) states that
The inclusion of the common interest principle in the operative part of the treaty instead of its retention merely in the preamble of the treaty was because Brazil initiated such a proposal, which had the distinction of being accepted unanimously, including by the United States and Soviet Union (
The exploration and use of outer space as a global common is influenced by the intrinsically interdependent and interlinked provisions of the OST
Today, outer space is a democratized domain that is accessed by over eighty countries, although there are only eleven space-faring states (including the European Space Agency). Typically, States use “space” for strengthening their national security and defense architectures, governance, inclusive socioeconomic developments, and commercial purposes. The success of creating a balance between the common interest mandate and commercial enterprise enabling is demonstrated by the fact that the global satellite communication market is estimated at $61.06 billion in 2023 (
The OST does not refer to the term global common
The Moon Agreement (
The United States Executive Order of April 2020 rejected outer space as a global common and deemed that the Moon Agreement of 1979 was not relevant. Pursuant thereto, the US-led lunar program articulated a set of practical guidelines and principles for undertaking recovery and utilization of lunar resources, as set out in the Artemis accords (AA) document (
The China–Russia ILRS (
The main challenge here is to find a way to assure that the benefits and interests of all countries are included as an inherent part of any future regulatory framework; this should be applicable to new-generation space activities involving planetary resource exploration, exploitation, and utilization in multilateral lunar projects led by advanced space powers at the time of increasing militarization in outer space and geopolitics of power contestations.
It is instructive to recall the utilization of natural space resources, Earth orbits, and spectrum RFs that facilitated the space age. We recall that the benefits and interests of all nations, as postulated in the OST, is at the heart of the Broadcasting Principles of 1983 (
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, it is argued that assuring the benefits and interests of all countries would be possible if a new governance framework for space activities involving exploration, exploitation, and utilization of space resources is adopted by COPOUS and then by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), possibly by way of a new treaty for that purpose. It is suggested that the proposed way ahead would have a better chance of success if the states would similarly agree to and adopt a proposal to establish a new institutional mechanism for implementing and administering the new governance framework.
In a significant development, the COPOUS established the working group (WG) on legal aspects of space resource activities in 2021. The WG is working on a 5-year plan up to 2027; to this end, the WG will consider the existing legal and normative frameworks for such activities, particularly the OST and other applicable UN treaties, along with other relevant instruments. This work may include the development of potential models, rules, and norms for activities in the exploration, exploitation, and utilization of space resources, including those with respect to related activities and benefit sharing (
It has been argued that it would be of cardinal importance to adopt an agreement on implementation of the new legal governance framework by the COPOUS for space resource activities involving planetary resources. This is critical for ensuring safe and orderly development of this new vertical of space activities, particularly since no state has previous experience in such activities. The closest example of such an institution that may be considered is the International Seabed Authority (ISA) (
The moot question here is whether the states will ensure consensus in the COPOUS and UNGA for adopting the new legal governance framework’s models, rules, and norms for activities related to exploration, exploitation, and utilization of space resources and agree upon implementation through institutional mechanisms. In conclusion, success is important for continuing peaceful use of outer space, and the future of the OST itself may depend on this outcome.
RK: Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Writing–original draft, Writing–review and editing.
The author declares that no financial support was received for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.
ITU (2023). International Telecommunications Union regulates access to orbits and frequencies under Article 44, Para 2 (CS 196) of the Constitution of the ITU and reiterated in No.03 of the Radio Regulations, which state, inter alia,. . .. to ensure equitable access to orbits and frequencies, taking into account the special needs of the developing countries . . .. ITU has representatives of the government and the private sector which coordinate global telecommunications networks, including services and satellite spectrum cited in Joanne Wheeler in the International Telecommunications Union Access to Spectrum, the Space Law Review, UK. Available at:
Outer Space Treaty (1967)Outer Space Treaty: states are required (i) States are required to undertake space activities in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding (Article III); (ii) prohibition on weaponization of Earth orbit and prohibition on the militarization of the Moon and other celestial bodies(Article IV); (iii) to treat astronauts as envoy of mankind and render them all possible assistance in event of accident, emergency and distress, to return the astronauts safely and promptly to the State of registry of their space vehicle (Article V); (iv) to bear international responsibility for authorization and continuing supervision of space activities undertaken by their non- government entities ( NGE/commercial companies) to assure that national space activities are undertaken in conformity with the Treaty (Article VI); (v) to be internationally liable for damage caused by its space object (state and commercial) in outer space, in air space and on the Earth (Article VII); (vi) to ensure the registration of its space objects (Article VIII) ; (vii) to undertake activities with due regard to the corresponding interest of all other states, to avoid harmful interference in activities of other states and seek prior consultation if the proposed activity may be harmful and avoid contamination of Earth orbit (Article IX) ; (viii) to afford opportunities to observe flight of space objects launched by them (Article X), (ix) to informthe Secretary General of the United Nations as well as the public of the nature, conduct, locations, and results of their space activities (Article XI); and (x) to provide access to stations, installations , equipment and space vehicles on theMoon and celestial bodies (Article XII).