This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Inspired by the US government’s denial that outer space is a global commons, and the heated discussion in China regarding property rights in outer space resources, this article looks at this controversial term: “global commons”. It finds that this term was mostly adopted as a political, rather than legal, term. As a result of the over-emphasis on the implications of global commons on the property rights to outer space resources, states that plan to develop private space mining may avoid calling outer space a global commons. This article argues that this response may not be necessary. It then examines the real purpose of the global commons discourse by analogizing the tragedy of commons and thus puts forward the suggestion to adopt the non-exclusive use standard to govern the activities of space resource extraction by private parties. This solution will allow countries to continue to view outer space as a global commons while liberalizing private parties’ activities in outer space resource development and extraction. Moreover, China’s initiative of the global community of shared future possesses the potential to serve as the overarching concept to govern its future outer space activities, including space mining.
香京julia种子在线播放
After the Trump Administration confirmed that they do not view outer space as a global commons,
In contrast, the EU considers outer space as a global commons. (
In alignment with the EU, China consistently holds that outer space is a global commons. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (“MOFA”) reiterated this statement in its regular press conferences. However, it is interesting to note that this concept was translated differently in previous regular MOFA press conferences. (
If one analyzes the 2015 Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act and the 2020 Executive Order of the U.S. as a whole, an important implication appears that they see global commons contradictory to the property rights of private parties to outer space resources. Truly, commercial space companies need to safeguard by law the benefits that they will obtain from outer space. Otherwise, they will be disincentivized for investments in space or developing outer space activities.
I have structured this article as follows. In Part 2, I explain global commons through the tragedy of commons. Part 3 proposes that outer space resource extraction should ensure non-exclusive use rather than putting the focus on the property rights of these resources. In Part 4, I introduce the initiative of a global community of shared future that China may adopt in the future to address issues regarding outer space resources. Part 5 suggests using license conditions to implememt the non-exclusive standard. The conclusion reached is that outer space as a global commons and the notion of private property rights are not mutually exclusive. Global commons is a term focused on avoiding the tragedy of commons on a global level, with the sustainability development goal in a central place. I suggest that the standard of non-exclusive use standard should be used to govern the extraction of outer space resources.
While it makes sense that to offer legal protection to private actors for their outer space activities, the U.S., followed by Luxembourg
First, global commons had not been strictly used as a legal term. Equally put, this notion does not indicate any legal obligations regarding the property rights to resources extracted from outer space should the outer space be acknowledged as a global commons. This concept does not exist in any of the five legally binding space law instruments.
On the national level, this concept was mostly adopted in policies, diplomatic statements, and other political documents, as implied by the practice in China and the U.S. As Guoyu Wang argued, the word “commons” originated from economics. But as a theoretical basis of global governance, this concept comes from the discipline of international relations. (
Second, one can interpret global commons by analogizing g “the tragedy of the commons”, which indicates that if individuals have access to a public resource, namely, the commons, in their interests only, the resources will be finally depleted. (
Global commons can be reasonably translated as to avoid the tragedy of commons on a global scale. Specifically, the lack of mechanisms against resource depletion will put global commons in the doom of the tragedy of commons. (
The analogy of the tragedy of commons sheds light on the global commons, offering us a new angle to view the nature of global commons as a concept that does not have to be associated with any requirements regarding outer space property rights. As long as effective governance that restrains parties from depleting the resources is in place, one can be assured that the nature of outer space as a global commons is respected.
As previously mentioned, the controversy over the legitimacy of entitling private actors property rights, particularly the ownership, of resources extracted from outer space is largely due to the fear that states as traditional powers and private actors as new players will exploit the outer space by competing to claim as much as possible the property rights to outer space resources.
While concerns regarding entitling private actors to the rights to outer space resources remains reasonable, such entitlement might be an inevitable trend in the future. As discussed, the exploration of outer space increasingly relies on private actors and they thus require to be secured for the interests obtained from their space adventure. Ricky Lee also wisely observed that “the development of space resources would also increase the need for additional infrastructure in the Earth orbit or the surface of the Moon, in turn increasing the demand for mineral resources from space. This need for the development of resource exploitation in outer space appears […] to be only a matter of time.” (
According to my opinion, under international law, the extraction of, and claim for, rights to space resources is not forbidden. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty only sets out that “outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” As space resources, are not outer space, the Moon, and other celestial bodies
In China, another set of heated debates over space resources arise: over which types of resources can private parties claim rights and which types of property rights can they claim. Some arguments from Chinese space-law scholars can be summarized as follows: (1) Private actors should be entitled to all types of rights to outer space resources, including ownership. (
This article holds the opinion that the divergent opinions listed above reflect different understandings of the definition of the controversial “global commons”, which were discussed with a focus on its implications on the ownership of the commons and the resources therefrom. The difficulty in reaching a consensus on this topic illustrates that the emphasis on property rights can hardly help us find a solution to the discussed questions. One reason responsible for this ineffective communication is that the dialogues are based on the concept of global commons, which as previously argued must not be seen as a strictly defined legal term and different interpretations of this term make this term even more confusing. Thus, the dialogue is based on varied understandings of this term and some of them might be incorrect. Also, even though all the listed arguments have their standings, some of the discussions may deviate from practice. For example, in response to the second opinion, it may not be always possible to distinguish the rights to profits from the right to ownership because the rights to profits may be performed as the trade of certain resources. In my view, the action of trading is in essence the exercise of the ownership right. As such, the dichotomy adopted to draw a line between the right of ownership and other types of rights to space resources has its internal deficiency as many cases are situated in the grey area.
If we change the focus from property rights to the non-exclusive effect of resource extraction activities in outer space, the question seems much easier. Global commons, as discussed, aims at avoiding the tragedy of commons on a global level, but this term does not imply the denial of the entitlement of property rights to outer space resources to both national and private parties. The standard of non-exclusive use can serve as a substitute for the traditional approach, which puts the focus on property rights when it comes to the debate on the boundary of private actors’ freedom in utilizing space resources. (
Notably, the non-exclusive use standard on the time level is pertinent to the global commons nature of outer space because it responds directly to the sustainability concern as the core of the tragedy of the commons. The requirement of sustainable development of the commons can safeguard the outer space commons by restraining parties from depleting the resources in their own interests. Although many new ideas regarding space mining technology developed over the past 20 years, there is still a long way to go to be able to do scale space mining. (
One may question whether the anti-depletion logic can be reconciled with the trading logic. In other words, whether an authorized investment that aims for profit can be at the same time subject to non-exclusive use restrictions. My opinion remains that it can be a feasible solution in the special space-mining context in the early stage. First,
In September and October 2023, the Chinese government published two white papers entitled “A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions” (
That said, I still believe that this initiative resonates with the essential pursuit of the global commons, namely, all humans, regardless of their nationality should cooperate to survive the “immense and unprecedented crises” to enable the “sustainable development of human civilization” and finally to build a beautiful future for all.
The non-exclusive use standard can be incorporated as a license condition in the licenses that are authorized by the national regulatory agencies to private parties. This solution is underpinned by Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, which sets out that state parties are responsible for space activities conducted by non-governmental agencies via “authorization” and “continuing supervision”.
The regulatory agency can mandate in a license condition that private actors must not impede the use in the same region, or on the same celestial body, in outer space at the same time by other parties. Nor can it deprive other parties of the opportunities to conduct similar resource extraction activities in the future by depleting these resources or conducting outer space activities in a damageable way. In practice, the designation of license conditions can be more innovative to require the licensed private actors to submit a demonstration report, proving why the outer space resource extraction plan will not exclude or impede the development of outer space by other parties in a similar way.
Individual countries, or their national space agencies or other designated governmental agencies, have the power to issue licenses. Thus, the power to impose license conditions, in the context of global commons, with a view to sustainability belongs to each country and their respective space agency or other governmental agencies with the delegated power. One might ask whether the Committee on the Peaceful (COPUOS) within the United Nations system, a specialized committee at the global level dedicated to addressing the challenges and opportunities presented by activities in space, has the power to issue licenses and impose license conditions for non-exclusive use purposes.
While COPUOS plays a crucial role in promoting international cooperation and the development of guidelines for space activities, it does not have the authority to issue licenses to space companies. The reason can be found on the level of the Outer Space Treaty. The licensing regime serves as a manner for states to implement the obligatory provision of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, specifically, state parties’ obligations to authorize and continuously supervise their private parties’ outer space activities. Accordingly, only states have the obligation, or the power, to scrutinize private parties that they have control over. COPUOS or other similar international organizations are not legitimately authorized to assume the obligation of issuing licenses.
Truly, the authorization of space resource extraction is a matter of profound international concern. In terms of this fact, intergovernmental organizations with a special focus on the global governance of outer space, particularly COPUOS, seem to be an appropriate agency to decide whether or not to allow outer space resource extraction activities by private parties. However, if it does so, there might be a concern of violating Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty because it is not each individual state party who has made such decisions. Thus, this article argues that it is premature within the current legal framework to authorize COPUOS the power to issue licenses and impose licensing conditions.
That said, COPUOS can contribute to the making of guidelines with agreed specific licensing standards that individual countries can adopt when licensing and imposing conditions on their private parties. The number of members of COPUOS continuously increased from 18 in 1958 to 102 in 2022.
While it is beyond the scope of this short article to showcase all possible approaches to implementing the non-exclusive use standard, the following thoughts may offer some inspiration for regulators. First, private space corporations, which apply for a license to conduct resource extraction can be encouraged or required to provide a cooperation plan or sign with the regulatory agency a memorandum of understanding (MOU).
The global commons concept has been long interwoven with the debate of the legitimacy and the extent of private actors’ rights to space resources. The U.S. adopted an approach that the recognition of outer space as a global commons contradicts such property rights. Chinese international law and space law scholars had arguments regarding whether or not, and to what extent, private parties can obtain outer space resources. This article does not see mutual exclusiveness between outer space as a global commons and private property rights to outer space resources.
The original contributions presented in the study are included in the article/Supplementary material, further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
DM: Conceptualization, Methodology, Resources, Writing–original draft, Writing–review and editing.
The author(s) declare that no financial support was received for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.
Exec. Order No. 13,914, 85 FR 20381 (2020) (the U.S.), s 1.
This Act amended Title 51 of the United States Codes by adding the Chapter 513. This Chapter includes Section 51302 (commercial exploration and commercial recovery), which clearly sets out the aim to “facilitate commercial exploration for and commercial recovery of space resources by United States citizens”.
Department of Defense, ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’ (2012) vol 1, 3; Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World’ (2016) 30. This report viewed outer space as a global commons, which is “available to all but owned by none.”
Pepijn Bergsen and others, ‘China and the Transatlantic Relationship’ (Chatham House 2022) 17
ibid 19.
Commission on the Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy,
Article 1: “Space resources are capable of being owned.” Law of 2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources, Luxembourg (Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de l’espace).
These are the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Rescue and Return Agreement (1968), the Liability Convention (1972), the Registration Convention (1975), and the Moon Agreement (1979).
Wang, G. (2019). Comparative analysis of the legal characters of outer space and cyberspace, and sovereign legal relationship. Law Rev., 145–147.
ibid. One should note that “the common heritage of mankind”, unlike the notion of “global commons”, is entrenched in Article 11 of the Moon Agreement. The unsuccessful subscription of the agreement, according to the number of its contracting parties, implies that the concept of “the common heritage of mankind” is also not widely accepted by states. The fact that Australia, a party to the Moon Agreement, later became a party to the Artemis Accords, showed a tendency to stay clear from the “common heritage of mankind” notion, which they used to embrace. Ajey Lele, ‘India Joins the Artemis Accords’ (
Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243 at 1248.
Some authors also understood global commons through the lens of the tragedy of the commons. Erin A. Clancy used the mixed phrase “the tragedy of the global commons” to argue that “the tragedy of the commons occurring is not lessened when dealing on a global scale”. ibid. When discussing the application of the doctrine of
Pepijn Bergsen and others, ‘China and the Transatlantic Relationship’ (Chatham House 2022) 17 at 17
Article I stipulates that “the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind.”
A key reason is the high capital threshold of the industry. Olaf Steffen, ‘Explore to Exploit: A Data-Centred Approach to Space Mining Regulation’ (2022) 59 Space Policy.
For example, the UN set up 17 sustainability development goals (SDGs) to address a wide range of global challenges and guide efforts toward a more sustainable, equitable, and resilient future. United Nations, ‘The 17 Goals’ <
In Namibia, one type of mining license is a non-exclusive and non-renewable prospecting license for a 12-month duration. Alec Crawford, Jessica Mooney and Harmony Musiyarira, ‘IGF Mining Policy Framework Assessment: Namibia’ 13. Thailand also has three types of non-exclusive, non-renewable, and non-transferable mining licenses. Chandler MHM Limited-Nuanporn Wechsuwanarux and others, ‘In Brief: Mining Rights and Title in Thailand’ (
The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Full Text: A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions’ (26 September 2023)
Ibid, 4; The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: A Key Pillar of the Global Community of Shared Future’ (10 October 2023).
In the preamble, the 2018 Amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China added the wording “and promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind” right after “in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries.” Amendment 32 of the 2018 Amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. See the English version at Pkulaw, ‘Amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China’ (2018) <
The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Full Text: A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions’ (26 September 2023) preface
Many projects focused on the “global community of shared future” initiative emerged in academia after its introduction. See, for example, Zhao Xiaochun, ‘In Pursuit of a Community of Shared Future: China’s Global Activism in Perspective’ (2018) 4 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 23. These also include space law studies, for example, Fengna Xu and Jinyuan Su, ‘Shaping “a Community of Shared Future for Mankind”: New Elements of General Assembly Resolution 72/250 on Further Practical Measures for the PAROS’ (2018) 44 Space Policy 57. Some Chinese high-profile politicians also published articles in relation to this initiative, for example, Yang Jiechi, ‘Working for a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind by Promoting International Cooperation and Multilateralism’ (2019) 75 China International Studies 5.
Article VI reads “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”
In practice, the licensing regime has been used by the regulatory agencies to impose obligations to the licensed private space companies. In the U.S., persons, who operate private remote sensing systems, in or outside of the U.S., must obtain a license from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). A general license condition as stipulated in the Code of Federal Regulations requires that the licensees “upon request, offer to the government of any country (including the United States) unenhanced data collected by the system concerning the territory under the jurisdiction of such government without delay and on reasonable terms and conditions, unless doing so would be prohibited by law or license conditions.” 15 C.F.R. § 960.8(c) (2020).
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, ‘Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Membership Evolution’ <
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, ‘Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities’ (27 June 2018) <
This is not an obligation under international law. However, the government can choose to mandate this suggestion in the licensing regime.
See the preamble and Article I of the Outer Space Treaty.
Moon J Kim, ‘Toward Coherence: A Space Sector Public-Private Partnership Typology’ (2023) 64 Space Policy 1, 2.
ibid
This condition originates from the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space adopted by the United Nations Generally Assembly in 1986, in which Principle XII sets out that “as soon as the primary data and the processed data concerning the territory under its jurisdiction are produced, the sensed State shall have access to them on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost terms […]”.
Hence, the U.S. licensing regime for private remote sensing operations is a responsive, flexible, and binding tool to shift external soft rules to internal hard laws.